Ten Myths About Russia

Understanding and Dealing with Russia's Complexity and Ambiguity

Many characterizations of Russia don't get it right.

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SINCE the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, American thinking about Russia has been distorted by at least ten major myths. Both conservatives and liberals, Russophobes and Russophiles, have clouded understanding of Russia by promoting unrealistic expectations about a rapid transformation, oversimplifications of Russia's history, essentialist ideas about its political culture, and exaggerated notions of a threat to American interests. The illusions that have clouded U.S.-Russian relations during the last decade must be dispelled if the present shaky cooperation against terrorism is to lead to a more stable partnership.

Myth 1
A Popular Revolution, Led by Liberal Democrats, Overthrew the Communist System and Launched Russia on a Speedy Journey to Democracy and a Free Market Economy

Early accounts of the demise of the Soviet Union depicted a miraculous transfiguration of the Russian people, who had suddenly cast off the fearful habits of the past, courageously resisted hard-line communist efforts to re-impose totalitarian oppression, and enthusiastically embraced the Western model of democracy and free enterprise.[1] Along with many politicians and journalists, political scientists were caught up in the early euphoria about the supposed victory of Russian civil society against an oppressive state. Many espoused the transitology approach, presuming that Russia had made a radical break with Soviet institutions and embarked on an inexorable "transition" to democracy. This "democratic teleology" became dogma for those who interpreted the dissolution of the Soviet communist regime as a struggle between state and society.[2] Even some critics of the transition paradigm joined in the widespread tendency to interpret the *perestroika* era as a long "struggle with state institutions" waged by an "insurgent political society" and "the organized, independent, revolutionary opposition."[3]

Although there are elements of truth in such portrayals, they greatly exaggerate the level of popular participation in the demise of the Soviet regime. In fact, prior to the August coup attempt, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had led efforts to dismantle the Soviet regime. Gorbachev's reforms and nascent transitional policies, combined with the powers Yeltsin gained as leader of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), eroded the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). From 1985 to 1991 the party-state was increasingly incapacitated as the regime split three ways: regime soft-liners like Gorbachev, opposition moderates like Yeltsin, and hard-line conservatives with considerable influence in the organs of coercion and the Party apparat.[4]

In 1990, Yeltsin and his allies took control of the Russian republic's Party machinery and used it to undermine the domi-

nance of the CPSU. They expanded Gorbachev's efforts to partially separate the Party from the state and to decentralize the Union's relations with its republics, ultimately breaking the Soviet party-state's control over the Russian republic's bureaucracy, finances, and natural resources. These revolutionaries-from-above mobilized society for additional support, but the mobilization was minimal and society's resources were limited. Thus, society opposition played only a limited role in destroying the old order and building the new. Demonstrators in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and several other large cities, in relatively small numbers, actively resisted the attempted coup of August 1991, but across the country most Russians remained on the sidelines.[5] The coup's failure resulted from the three-way regime split, which by 1991 had extended to the party-state, the power ministries,[6] and the Party *apparat*. After the coup collapsed, the final destruction of the Soviet state and the construction of a new Russian regime were actually led by former Communist Party officials (including Yeltsin), opportunistic state bureaucrats, and younger members of the privileged *nomenklatura* class.[7] In sum, the revolution was a bureaucrat-led, state-based "revolution from above" far more than a popular revolution from below.[8]

Moreover, Yeltsin and his cohort were quick to demobilize societal opposition, restraining the development of civil society and a multi-party system in Russia. They soon cut a deal with the Soviet-era economic elite to co-opt the opposition emerging from the more partocratic element in the new ruling alliance against the domestic "neo-liberalism" and "pro-American" foreign policy of the young radicals.[9] Old apparatchiks and young members of the former *nomenklatura* divvied up Party and state property, excluding society from the great Soviet going-out-of-business sale.[10] In addition to the oligarchic-bureaucratic economy, the federal and political systems were constructed on the basis of intra-elite agreements. For example, the Russian Federation was built on the basis of bilateral treaties and agreements between the federal and regional executive branches that divided state property and finances among groups of bureaucrats. The political system was constructed in large part by incorporating Soviet state institutions (and apparatchiks) into the Russian state.[11]

The mistaken view of the revolution as one generated from below, and merely another case in a "third wave"[12] of global democratization, led to a cascade of unrealistic and false expectations, East and West, about the fate of Russia's third revolution in the twentieth century. The fall of the *ancien régime*, it was presumed, would lead almost inevitably to the consolidation of democracy and the market. This democratic teleology reinforced and sustained the view among decisionmakers that Russia could integrate into the West and the global economy with limited political and economic assistance. Like Estonia or Hungary, Russia, too, would find its way without anything akin to a Marshall Plan. The West could expand NATO without fear of provoking Moscow, because Russia was already on its way westward. If Moscow turned back, Russia and its culture were entirely to blame. The West would bear no responsibility for failure, which was unlikely anyway because a strong democrat was leading the transition.

Myth 2
Yeltsin Was a Democrat

Yeltsin has been lionized as the bold, white-haired leader who mobilized the Russian people from atop a tank.[13] In reality, he was a semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian personalistic ruler, schooled in the ways of bureaucratic intrigue by years of working in the Party machinery. Aside from those memorable three days in August 1991, Yeltsin fought the Soviet party-state more with presidential decrees, government instructions, and Russian state institutions than with demonstrations or general strikes. To be sure, he skillfully used the growing popular opposition to win concessions from Gorbachev's increasingly divided party-state. Deploying a tactical populism, Yeltsin appealed to the people when he needed to exert greater pressure on the regime to advance his revolutionary takeover of state institutions and Party resources.

However, after defeating the bumbling coup plotters, Yeltsin and his aides stifled the development of a multi-party system and civil society. Yeltsin refused to lead or even join a political party. He postponed promised regional elections and instead appointed regional governors until 1996. He co-opted any and all willing party-state apparatchiks into the state bureaucracy, regardless of their past records or attitudes toward developing democracy and a market economy. Few members of Yeltsin's administration—including Yeltsin himself—had more than a limited understanding of how a market economy functions. He made deals with former Soviet economic elites to reduce their opposition to the pro-American economic and foreign policies advocated by his more liberal advisers. This approach reached its logical conclusion in December 1992, when Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, the architect of market reforms, was replaced by the communist soft-liner Viktor Chernomyrdin, who had served Gorbachev as fuel and energy minister and a Central Committee member. Then, in 1993, Yeltsin forced the Russian legislature into a corner, abolished it, and ordered tanks to bombard the parliament building. After crushing the October 1993 rebellion, he closed down all the regional soviets. Although he finally held elections to a new federal parliament, the results of the simultaneous referendum on the new constitution may well have been falsified. When public approval of his government's painful and failing policies fell below 10 percent in 1996, Yeltsin came exceedingly close to canceling the scheduled presidential elections. He was able to secure victory only by buying votes with state funds and handing over the state's most valuable enterprises to oligarchs like Boris Berezovskii.[14]

While it is inaccurate to portray Yeltsin as a principled democratic leader, it is equally misleading to paint him as the embodiment of oppressive Russian authoritarianism. Despite his declining popularity, he refused to curb freedom of association, and he accepted the revived Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Although he sometimes manipulated and tried to intimidate the mass media, he tolerated substantial criticism of his policies from journalists. In short, Yeltsin was a hybrid figure—personalist and populist, authoritarian and democratic all at once. In terms of this internal contradiction, he was not unlike the country he ruled.

Myth 3
Russia Is Subject to Universal Laws of Development

Over the last decade, many policy advisers and scholars posited that Russia's inevitable destiny is to conform—or succumb—to the universal process of modernization. According to these arguments, Russia has no choice but to belatedly follow the paths to democracy and capitalism blazed decades or centuries ago by more advanced Western countries.[15]

In fact, Russia is not just another country to be plugged into preconceived formulas. It has a number of peculiarities that must be taken into account both to understand its "non-conformity" and to help transform it where possible. The main peculiarities include Russia's vast size, its geostrategic location, and the residual Soviet impression on its economic geography.

Russia's size has significant implications for both domestic and foreign policy that no other state can claim. By far the largest country in the world, Russia counts ten countries as neighbors. Its border with Kazakhstan alone is the same length as the boundaries of the continental United States. Russia's extensive borders and seacoasts require a large standing army and navy, which burden the budget and deplete economic manpower. These costs and the reality of a territorial expanse spanning eleven time zones would make it difficult for the federal government to build and maintain infrastructure (roads, railroads, bridges, power lines, etc.) even without the challenges of economic transformation. Russian officials and scholars now speak of a coming national techno-infrastructural catastrophe and of Russia's need to restore its "familiarization" with, and "possession" of, distant Siberia and the Far East.[16] The resources required to stave off the collapse of the country's infrastructure and develop Siberia and the Far East sufficiently to ensure their orientation toward Moscow would stretch the capacity of any economy, let alone Russia's weak post-communist one.

Geostrategically, Russia is the only country in the world that borders the European, Asian, and Muslim worlds. This places special burdens on its foreign and security policies. Russian national security strategists argue (sometimes with hyperbole) that the threat from each of these worlds is arguably growing.[17] In the east, the sleeping dragon is awake. In the south, the Muslim world is in turmoil, leading to terrorist jihads against the West and Russia, assistance for Chechen militants, and a threat to the stability of reasonably friendly secular regimes in Central Asia. In the west, NATO is expanding ever eastward, apparently to Russia's borders with the Baltic states, and eventually perhaps to Ukraine and Georgia. Any exacerbation of Russian security concerns in the three regions could set back progress on reforming the economy and post-Soviet institutions.

Russia's economic geography also hinders the conversion and modernization of its once heavily militarized industries. Russia has the only post-communist economy that consists of hundreds of one-company towns that, in many cases, dominate half the budgets of regions several times larger than medium-sized European countries. Closing, privatizing, or selling the company to foreigners will affect an entire region that is likely to be located hundreds of miles from any other population center. This constrains Russian willingness to engage in uncontrolled large-scale privatization, especially in the outlying regions. With the privatization of large enterprises, oligarchs came to dominate regional economies. Many are now parlaying their economic power into political power, becoming governors and senators. They seek office not to lobby for development aid for their regions, but to gain favors for their firms and immunity from prosecution.

These factors make it inadvisable to force a one-size-fits-all Western model on Russia. Transitology envisaged a rapid, almost automatic, transformation from hostile, autarchic Soviet totalitarianism to a Western-style Russian democracy and market. This mindset led to the belief that overhauling Russia's inefficient economy would not require massive Western financial assistance or new approaches tailored to Russian conditions.

Myth 4
Russia's Unique Culture Dooms It to Eternal Backwardness

When the illusions of sweeping overnight reforms failed to pan out, they gave way to disappointment, disenchantment, and disdain for Russia's alleged inability to change for the better. Bruce Clark, a British correspondent who stressed "Russia's sheer incomprehensibility," was one of the first to argue that the "Eastern Church" was a major obstacle to the Westernization. A little later, the political scientist Samuel Huntington defined Russia as the core of an inscrutable Orthodox civilization that was almost impossible to change. More recently, Matthew Brzezinski, another journalist, attributed the "loss" of the country to Russians' congenital corruption, their peculiar "Slavic soul," and their scheming, non-Western leaders.[18]

Such gloomy views were the opposite of the earlier euphoric universalism. While the zealous optimists had been overconfident about rapidly converting Russia, the pessimists wrongly disparaged Russians as irredeemably averse to Western values. As some pessimists exaggerated the influence of the Orthodox Church (despite seventy years of atheist persecution), others vented a racially tinged scorn for supposedly innate Russian traits (e.g., superstition, laziness, dishonesty). Overreacting to specific setbacks, especially the financial collapse of August 1998, the doomsayers prematurely wrote off Russia's ability to develop a prosperous economy.[19]

Myth 5
Russia Lacks the Cultural Requisites for Democracy and a Market Economy

After Russian voters elected an alarming number of communists and xenophobic nationalists to parliament in 1993 and 1995, many Western journalists and scholars began to voice gloomy appraisals of the incorrigible authoritarianism of

"eternal Russia."[20] In 1993, they exaggerate . the election outcome as a victory for the quirky quas -fascist Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party (63 deputies) and the communists.[21] In fact, the party of liberal ›ro-Western Egor Gaidar took a plurality of seats (76 deputies) in the Duma, and democratic and centrist parties took a majority of the Duma seats (51.7) after deputies elected in majoritarian single-member districts were factored in.[22] Such Russophobic pessimism faded in some circles when Yeltsin triumphed over his communist opponent in the 1996 presidential election and when the Russian stock market became bullish the following year. However, after Yeltsin handed over the presidency to former KGB officer Vladimir Putin at the end of 1999, there was a resurgence of scornful views of Russia as an impenetrable, irredeemable land of cruel masters and servile subjects. In the first days of Putin's presidency, for example, one relatively sophisticated correspondent declared: "Russians have been crushed for so long that they have learned to respond only to an iron fist."[23]

There have been numerous revolts against despotism and brief periods of quasi-democratic government that might have been more lasting had circumstances been more favorable.

In fact, there has been a recessive but nonetheless rich liberal-democratic sub-strain in Russian political culture that is too often ignored.[24] While Russian political history has indeed been dominated by authoritarianism and totalitarianism, there have been numerous revolts against despotism and brief periods of quasi-democratic government that might have been more lasting had circumstances been more favorable. The liberal Provisional Government of February–October 1917, in particular, might have been able to establish the foundations for democracy if Russia had not been entangled in World War I. Even in the darker periods of tsarist and Soviet rule, Russians formed revolutionary or dissident organizations, secretively circulated banned publications, and gained knowledge about the outside world from smuggled books or partially jammed radio broadcasts. Members of the "eternal Russia" school are fond of citing the Marquis de Custine's nineteenth-century indictment of Russians as obsequious Orientals, but like Custine, they miss the dynamic development of Russian society.[25]

Even as Russophobes in the West reproduce the myth that Russians are genetically antagonistic to democratic values, public opinion polls and in-depth interviews show that Russians have grown deeply attached to democratic processes and principles, despite their frequently acute disappointment with post-Soviet leaders and institutions.[26] Although the word *demokratiia* has acquired pejorative associations with corruption and foreign imposition, a recent in-depth survey conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows that the overwhelming majority of Russians treasure free elections (87 percent), freedom of expression (87 percent), freedom of the mass media (81 percent), freedom to choose place of residence (75 percent), and freedom of religion (70 percent).[27] Other recent polls show also a growing sense of economic well-being among Russians, an important prerequisite of middle-class democratic attitudes. According to one survey, over the last three years the number of survey respondents who regard the situation in Russia as catastrophic has fallen from 51 percent to 14 percent. Between 1995 and 2000, more than 50 percent of respondents felt that "life like this cannot go on any longer." By the end of 2001, only 27 percent claimed that life was intolerable. Although almost 42 percent believe they have suffered from the reforms, almost two-thirds view their current social status as "satisfactory," and 41 percent consider themselves to be middle-class.[28]

Contrary to the tendency of cultural essentialists to view Russians as passive, Russia now possesses a civil society that is a reasonably active, autonomous force. There are tens of thousands of non-governmental labor, business, environmental, anti-war, and other organizations that employ hundreds of thousands of citizens and represent the interests of around 20 million people. Some can already point to victories. Russia's trade unions recently forced the Duma to amend a draft Labor Code before passage. To be sure, Russian society could be more highly mobilized and better organized. But the enormous size of the country makes building nationwide organizations a difficult, expensive task, and with 80 percent of the capital concentrated in the city of Moscow, the overwhelming majority of Russians are too resource-starved for optimally effective self-organization. However, this is an argument not for dismissing the capacity of Russians for democratic activity, but for increasing Western aid to non-governmental organizations.

Even under current conditions, Russians manage to express their grievances and demand changes. On February 9, 2002, for example, 500 residents of Krasnoiarsk braved the Siberian winter to block a railroad used to import nuclear waste for processing in their region. At the same time, small business organizations protested tax hikes and other governmental decisions in regions across Russia.[29] In response, the federal government modified its tax policy to ease the burden on small businesses. There is also a strong social movement to institute alternatives to military service, and several regions began experimenting with such a system. Although the administration halted these illegal experiments, and stubborn military opposition forced the Putin administration to back, and the Duma to pass, an alternative service bill that requires a three and a half year commitment, the first step has been taken.[30] Moreover, the mayor of Nizhnii Novgorod recently reinstated his city's experiment after the Duma vote and vowed to support an NGO court challenge to the federal ban on regional versions of alternative service.

Myth 6
Putin Is a Dictator

Since the end of 1999, when he assumed the Russian presidency, Western commentators have asserted that the wellspring of Vladimir Putin's politics is his background as a KGB officer from the 1970s to 1980s and as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the late 1990s. Simplistically labeled a "former KGB operative," Putin is accused of seeking to return Russia to a "police state" and "dictatorship" by centralizing political control, suppressing the independent media, and cracking down on dissent. In July 2000, for example, only months after his inauguration, two American national security analysts asserted that "Putin is now building a police state using primarily the police organs of the Federal Security Service, known as the FSB, and the army to seize all key power positions in Russia, eliminate dissent and attack both internal and external enemies."[31] Similarly, *New York Times* columnist William Safire alleged that Putin planned to follow China's model and crush all democratic tendencies, and he implied that Putin would make himself "president for life."[32]

Such nightmarish predictions are one-sided and ill-informed. An accurate portrait of Putin, like that of Yeltsin or of Russia as a whole, must see him in all his complexity. The simplistic assumption that anyone formerly associated with the KGB must possess the very worst totalitarian impulses of the old regime and be incapable of countenancing democratic reforms reflects an ignorance of history. For example, Gorbachev ascended to the Soviet leadership with support from a former KGB chief, Iurii Andropov, and key KGB leaders played critical roles in the defeat of the August 1991 putsch by refusing orders to assault democratic forces.[33]

In fact, there is some evidence that Putin himself showed mildly semi-nonconformist and democratic inclinations during his KGB career. As Putin has told Russian journalists, in the early 1980s agents in the intelligence service "were permitted to think differently. And we could say things that few ordinary citizens could allow themselves to say."[34] Putin seems to have thought and spoke quite freely during his tenure as a KGB operative in East Germany. According to one relatively unknown biography, he told German friends as early as 1987 that he thought Soviet leaders should be chosen by secret ballot in popular elections.[35]

More important, the cynical view of Putin as first and last a KGB man ignores his tenure in the democratic government of St. Petersburg, an experience that exerts considerable influence on his political makeup. Like many *apparatchiki* in the Gorbachev era, Putin soon shifted from being a supporter of the sinking Soviet regime to a moderate revolutionary. In 1990, he effectively left the KGB and returned to St. Petersburg State University, where he had earned a law degree. There he became an assistant to rector in charge of international liaison at St. Petersburg State University, where USSR People's Deputy Anatolii Sobchak was still a law professor a leading moderate democrat, was elected mayor of St. Petersburg later that year. During the attempted hard-line coup of August 1991, Putin reportedly played a key role by negotiating with the commander of the Baltic Military District to prevent troops from entering the city. After the Soviet collapse, the St. Petersburg administration, with Putin as Sobchak's top deputy, followed Yeltsin's lead in banning the CPSU, abolishing the Soviet Union, and privatizing state property. (This also meant that Putin became involved with the corruption that was part-and-parcel of the economic revolution from above.)

After Sobchak lost his re-election bid in 1996, Putin jumped to Yeltsin's presidential administration, where he eventually became intimately familiar with one of the leading alleged state inside traders of the Yeltsin era. As deputy to Kremlin property manager Pavel Borodin, Putin probably was privy to at least some of Borodin's financial and property machinations and the Kremlin's dirty dealings with oligarchs. Later, as chief of the administration's State Control Directorate, he monitored implementation of laws and presidential decrees. Putin saw first-hand the regions' disdain for federal law as well as the institutional chaos at the federal level created by the flood of presidential decrees, governmental orders, and other normative documents that were often self-contradictory and ignored by competing bodies. This is a source of Putin's efforts to re-centralize power in Moscow, harmonize regional law with federal law, and make federation institutions more efficient.

Putin and his cohort of pragmatic former Soviet officials are neither solely authoritarian nor purely democratic. Although Putin has condemned violations of the law by KGB officers in the Soviet era, he has also stated his opposition to declassifying files and his abhorrence at having a democrat, Vadim Bakatin, head the post-Soviet FSK after the 1991 coup.[36] While Putin and his associates respect the democratic processes (mainly free elections) established in the 1990s that serve to legitimate their power, they were disturbed by the drastic decline of federal authority in the Yeltsin era and the degeneration of Russia to near lawlessness.

Since his election as president in March 2000 with 53.44 percent of the vote, Putin has centralized federal power at the expense of the formerly wayward regions, consolidated several centrist parties into one large party, "United Russia," united factions in the Duma, and sought to co-opt into state-organized corporatist structures members and groups previously organized in autonomous associations. His authoritarian measures have been undertaken with a soft sleight of hand rather than an iron fist, as in the effort to remove the NTV and TV-6 television stations, respectively, from the control of the oligarchs Vladimir Gusinskii and Berezovskii. Putin has tolerated oligarchs as long as they limit their clandestine political activities, forgo building independent media empires, and perform economic tasks for the state. Here, he seems to be caught between two of his formative political experiences: his rise to power with the help of oligarchs like Borodin and Berezovskii, and his disdain for the oligarchs' corrupting effect on the state.

The more liberal Petersburg experience in Putin's political biography also informs his presidency. Putin has taken some quasi-democratic political positions, such as ignoring numerous calls, many from governors themselves, for regional governors and republic presidents to be appointed rather than elected. He has also twice quashed efforts to lengthen presidential terms

from four to seven years. In economic s, Putin has taken important steps to cut taxes and business re gulations, encourage foreign investment, and begin reforms o the judiciary, procuracy, and military. In sum, neither Putin s pre-presidential background nor his policies as president m tch the caricature of him as an untrustworthy KGB spook turne l would-be dictator.

Depictions of Yeltsin as a bold, her ic democrat and Putin as a sneaky, sinister autocrat are therefore seriously misleading and mask the important continuities between the Yeltsin and Putin eras. Both manipulated democratic processes and showed some authoritarian tendencies while blocking a totalitarian restoration. The worst-case outcome of Putin's likely eight years in power is probably a very soft authoritarian regime still plagued by high rates of crime, corruption, and rights violations—a situation not much worse than that left behind by Yeltsin. The best-case scenario is a somewhat better institutionalized democracy and market economy, with a slightly stronger civil society, considerable structural reform in the economy, less penetration of the state by business interests, somewhat greater horizontal accountability, and fewer violations of civil and political rights in the regions—a situation slightly better than that bequeathed by Yeltsin to Putin.

Myth 7
Russians Are Inherently Anti-Western and Anti-American

Outbursts of anger and bitterness by nationalist and communist demagogues because of harsh economic policies and Russia's declining global prestige have led many in the West to conclude that xenophobia is implanted in the bones of Russians like some long-lived radioactive isotope. However, most increases in Russian anti-Western sentiment have been provoked by Western policies and actions.

To some extent, the rise of anti-American feeling in the mid-1990s was a predictable counterpart to the naive idealization of the United States between 1989 and 1992. With the downfall of the Soviet Union, many urban Russians vaguely hoped that their country would magically become as prosperous as the United States, and they expected massive financial aid as a reward for overthrowing the "evil empire." When no Marshall Plan for Russia materialized and the economic reforms pushed by American advisers brought widespread hardship, many became disillusioned and embittered.[37]

While anti-American attitudes were held by roughly 30–40 percent of Russians in 1993, the figure doubled later in the decade in reaction to the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs in 1994, and the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999.[38] When 60–70 percent of Russian respondents say that the United States or NATO poses a threat to Russia, it should be understood as a reflection of the history of military invasions of Russia from the West and the emotional tribulations Russians have undergone over the last decade more than an inherited cultural paranoia. It is also not a completely irrational response to such Western policies as the expansion of NATO up to Russia's borders, the increase in the number of Russian cities listed as potential targets of U.S. nuclear missiles, and the challenges to Russia's right to a sphere of influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Unlike the rabidly anti-American extremists who have drawn disproportionate media coverage, an overwhelming majority of Russians have either a friendly or an ambivalent attitude toward the United States and the West. Among those who are ambivalent, opinion is subject to abrupt changes of attitude in response to specific events. For example, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 induced a wave of sympathy for America from Russians who believe their own country has been the victim of terrorist raids and bombings by Chechen rebels. Russians generally supported the U.S. effort to bring to justice al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. An October 2001 public opinion survey conducted by the Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion, for example, showed that 56 percent of Russians wished the United States success in its war against terrorism in Afghanistan.[39] In early 2002, anti-Americanism became more pronounced, partly because many believed that Russian competitors had been victimized by unfair judging and scapegoating at the Salt Lake City Olympic Games. However, the anger over Salt Lake soon faded, and anti-American sentiment again centered on the sizeable minority who are suspicious of NATO expansion and believe the United States is seeking to subordinate Russia to American interests rather than pursuing a respectful partnership.[40]

Like President Putin, who emphatically declares "we are Europeans," many Russians, especially in the younger generations, believe that Russia is or should be a part of Europe.[41] But if Russians feel humiliated, insulted, and excluded by the West, they will be more likely to look for allies in the East and to define themselves as Eurasian.[42]

Myth 8
Russia Is an Expansionist, Neo-Imperialist Menace

Despite the drastic decline of Russian power since 1991, Russophobes like the *New York Times* columnist William Safire have repeatedly charged Russia with harboring its "old imperialist urge." Even as Russia provided much valuable intelligence to assist the U.S. war in Afghanistan, one American think tank deployed its experts to denounce the Northern Alliance's occupation of Kabul as part of a grand Russian "military strategy" and an "ominous gambit" to expand Russian influence in South Asia.[43] Stratfor director George Friedman went a step further, warning that Russia's cooperation with the West in Afghanistan was paving the way for Russia's resurgence and the next war, which would pit Russia against the West.[44] Such views perpetuate reflexive cold war suspicions and wrongly draw a straight line from the nineteenth-century "Great Game" through the alleged Soviet quest for a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean to the new Russia's supposed expansionist aims in Central and South Asia. Proponents seem to have forgotten that Russia was but one of several players in the Great Game, as it was in the much older European game of partitioning Poland.

A long-range view of American-Russian relations thus suggests that collisions are more likely to stem from the expansion of U.S. commercial interests and security commitments than from rampant Russian imperialism.

The projection of cold war antagonism into the post–cold war era rests, in part, on a shallow historical perspective. In more than 200 years of Russian-American relations, the two countries' vital interests rarely clashed before the cold war. When the United States expanded across the North American continent in the nineteenth century, Russia withdrew from settlements in the Pacific Northwest and then sold Alaska for pennies an acre. As American commerce expanded in Northeast Asia around 1900, Theodore Roosevelt and others briefly feared that Russia's prolonged occupation of Manchuria jeopardized the Open Door policy, but between the Japanese thrashing of Russia in 1904–5 and VJ Day in 1945, most U.S. leaders realized that Russia was actually a potential ally against the most formidable threat to U.S. interests across the Pacific. A long-range view of American-Russian relations thus suggests that collisions are more likely to stem from the expansion of U.S. commercial interests and security commitments than from rampant Russian imperialism.

In more recent years, the specters raised by Russophobic analysts have repeatedly failed to materialize. Putin's turn to the West after September 2001 was a ruse, they warned—Russia would use the "alliance" against terror to bolster its oil and gas pipeline dreams, and then exploit its resulting enhanced international status to challenge American hegemony. Despite the alarms raised by Russophobes, the deployment of Russian Emergency Ministry forces to build a high-tech field hospital and re-establish a Russian embassy in Kabul generated no challenge to U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Indeed, Putin later revealed that the Russian descent on Kabul was carried out with the aid of U.S. forces.

Beyond Afghanistan, there have been few major Russian challenges to U.S. initiatives. Although the two governments squabbled in the spring of 2002 over U.S. duties on Russian steel and a Russian ban on imports of American chicken, Putin calmly accepted the U.S. abandonment of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, supported U.S. military aid to the Republic of Georgia against terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, and bowed to Pentagon demands for flexibility to secure a nuclear weapons reduction treaty. Moscow's top priority has clearly been not to defy Washington, but to speed Russia's economic integration into the West.

Even if the Russian government wanted to pursue a sustained imperialist foreign policy, it lacks sufficient military and economic power to do so. An economy no larger than that of the Netherlands is barely capable of supporting imperialist aspirations in Eurasia, much less beyond. Russia has been unable to invigorate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a viable international organization, much less as a precursor to a renewed economic union. Only Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan have joined the CIS Customs Union, and these are the states that are least viable and most dependent on Russia to begin with.

All of Russia's seeming neo-imperialist gambits in the post-Soviet era have been either exaggerated by Western analysts or episodic in implementation, intended to manipulate weak bordering states rather than re-incorporate them into a revived Soviet Union. Russia has played a clearly positive role by stationing the 201st Division in Tajikistan, thereby deterring Islamic incursions from Afghanistan and stabilizing the weak and corrupt—but secular—regime of Imomali Rokhmonov in Dushanbe. Western critics of the involvement of Russian forces in Georgia and Transdniestr have ignored the financial costs Russia will incur by withdrawing its troops and equipment, as well as the instability that might result. In Central Asia, where Russian national security really is threatened, weak regimes like Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have not been pressured to join a political union with Russia. The so-called Russia-Belarus Union is largely a fiction, even as an economic union. The two sides cannot agree on a common currency, and even the customs agreement has been the subject of repeated disputes between the parties. Any prospects of a real Belarus-Russia Union are minimal until President Aleksandr Lukashenka leaves the scene, since the economies of the two states are vastly different, with Russia having implemented economic liberalization far beyond the virtually unreformed Soviet-style Belarusian economy.

Myth 9
Russia Is No Longer an Important International Player

Many so-called realists believe that Russia is so weakened that it is no longer a serious international player whose interests need to be taken into account when planning American foreign policy.[45] For example, Eugene B. Rumer of the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies advised the Bush administration that Russia "will not bounce back from its troubles anytime soon" and suggested "Its current decline may well continue indefinitely."[46] More colorfully, journalist Jeffrey Tayler called Russia "Zaire with Permafrost" and argued that its history doomed the country to shrink, decay, and disintegrate.[47]

Although Russia has experienced a breathtaking decline in its fortunes since the cold war, when the Soviet superpower confronted the United States around the world, it is not so weak that it no longer counts as a great power, and its problems are not necessarily permanent or irremediable. Russia's possession of thousands of nuclear weapons is not the only factor that explodes the myth of its insignificance. Besides the United States, Russia is the only country that is a major player in Europe, the Pacific, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East simulta-

neously. Because of its geostrateg c position and relatively high level of technological developme .t, Russia is a major player in the global energy market as well is in several other natural resource exports. It maintains a falte ring but still major space program that is matched only by NASA.

To be sure, Russia's economy is small compared not only with other major powers in the Group of Seven (G-7), but also with many smaller states. However, Russia's vast natural resources, strong human capital, and potential for investment growth represented by the hundreds of billions of dollars secreted in foreign bank accounts suggest, taken together, that a fairly rapid revitalization is possible. With the right policies in these areas, including investors' rights, banking reform, and money-laundering, anti-corruption, and anti-crime laws, a Russian economic revival is quite conceivable. In the last three years, Russia's economy has experienced steady, substantial growth, and Moscow has taken important steps to reverse capital flight, encourage foreign investment, and overhaul its financial system. Russia recovered from its earlier "times of troubles" (in the seventeenth century, during the Crimean War, and during the civil war of 1917–21). It may now be on the way to recovery again.

Myth 10
Russia and the United States Are Strategic Allies

The newest myth is that the United States and Russia became strategic partners, even allies, after the events of September 11, 2001. To be sure, 9/11 reshuffled international affairs in general, and Russian-American relations in particular—at least temporarily. The terrorist attacks highlighted the previously ignored mutual interest in combating militant Islam and international terrorism that Washington and Moscow have shared since the end of the cold war. But there is no guarantee that this common interest will remain clear or paramount to Russian and American policymakers.

Some leaders on each side read developments in Afghanistan as justifying a suspicion that the other country is pursuing selfish gains at the expense of their own country. Thus, certain American actions reinforced the suspicions of some Russians that the United States is seeking to parlay the war against terror into a war for control of oil, gas, and pipeline routes. American special operations forces and marines were first deployed mainly in the south among the Pashtun, who make up the majority of the population of Pakistan, and the United States has had good relations with Pakistan since the cold war. The Pashtun also make up the bulk of the Taliban, who, Russian analysts have long suspected, were backed by Washington to counter Russian interests in Central Asia. The United States inserted Afghan Pashtun leader Abdul Haq into southern Afghanistan in order to entice local Pashtun leaders and Taliban commanders to defect from Osama bin Laden. This was viewed by Russian commentators as an effort to rally Pashtuns around a charismatic leader against the Afghan minorities of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Khazaris that make up the Northern Alliance, backed for years by Russia, Iran, and India. In addition, American bombing sorties around the town of Mazar i Sharif and the Baghram airport in the initial stage of the campaign in the north were regarded by many observers both East and West, including the Northern Alliance, as surprisingly tame. This fact, and later warnings by President Bush that the alliance should refrain from immediately entering Kabul, led some Russian officials to fear that Washington wanted to delay Kabul's capture so its southern allies could enter before the Northern Alliance.

Back in Washington, some experts claimed that Moscow's outward show of cooperation masked an effort to utilize American power for its own ulterior purposes. For example, Toby Gati, a State Department official in the Clinton Administration, declared that Putin "had the Americans doing his business in Afghanistan and he was fighting to the last American."[48] In a similar vein, Russia's dispatch of Emergency Ministry personnel to Kabul to set up a hospital was variously interpreted as a second Pristina,[49] the beginning of Russian troop deployments, and an intelligence operation.

As of the summer of 2002, potential ruptures have been averted or smoothed over by a division of labor. The Russians are working closely with the largely Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance, providing assistance for infrastructure and military development, while the United States maintains close ties to the Pashtuns and leads the military struggle against the terrorists in the south. However, there is no guarantee that there will be no friction in the future.

There is also a potential for conflict in the Republic of Georgia, where the U.S. military is training Georgian units for an operation against Taliban and al Qaeda forces holed up in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Despite Putin's tempered response, statements by foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, and others clearly indicate that many Russian leaders are dissatisfied with this American incursion into the post-Soviet space. The tension will only be exacerbated if the American-Georgian operation does not eliminate Chechen militants in the gorge.

Russian and American interests that coincided relatively well in destroying the Taliban will be less harmonious if and when the campaign shifts to Iraq.

Moreover, Russian and American interests that coincided relatively well in destroying the Taliban will be less harmonious if and when the campaign shifts to Iraq. Saddam Hussein's regime owes $7 billion to Russia and offers the potential for billions of dollars more in future oil and other contracts once sanctions are lifted. Russia also has economic interests in Iran, which is a major purchaser of Russian arms and a recipient of Russian nuclear technology. Moscow has already warned that it does not agree with Bush's categorization of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as a new "axis of evil." When push comes to

shove. Russia is likely to exercise its veto in the UN Security Council, forcing the Bush administration to act alone or at least with fewer allies. Tension over Iraq and Iran could complicate over pivotal issues in Russian-American relations, including Russian human rights violations in Chechnya, U.S. plans for a national missile defense system, and a second round of NATO expansion likely to reach Russia's western border.

Putin has brought Russia along so far, but expanding the anti-terrorism campaign to include Russian trading partners and debtors like Iran and Iraq could exhaust his political skills. Facing strong criticism of his cooperation with the United States from the Russian military, security forces, military-industrial complex, communists, and Muslims, Putin could buckle and revert to a Eurasian strategy of seeking much closer ties with China and Arab and Islamic states. Similarly, the Bush administration, split between militant unilateralists and moderate multilateralists, could tilt away from consultation and conciliation with Russia in order to pursue priority objectives unilaterally, some of which are believed to offer domestic political payoffs. In short, it is premature to be celebrating a Russian-American strategic partnership.

Beyond the Myths: Understanding and Dealing with Russia

To have a stable and positive relationship with Putin's Russia, the United States must move beyond the myths and polarized perspectives of the past decade. It is dangerous for both U.S.-Russian relations and international security for Washington to see Russia through monochromatic glasses, either dark or bright. Like the overly optimistic assessments of Russia's progress toward democracy and capitalism in the 1990s, the rosy views of a strategic partnership with the United States may produce a new round of disappointment and disdain. On the other hand, excessively pessimistic or alarmist views of Russia's supposedly failed democratization, innate authoritarians, and imperialism can undermine Russian-American cooperation and close off opportunities to influence Russia's political and social evolution.[50] To avoid falling into the overreaction trap once more, we must have a clear, nuanced, and balanced view of Russia.

Russia is a kaleidoscope of interacting positive and negative trends. These must be detected and sorted out by way of objective analysis free of political science preconceptions, historical simplifications, and Russophobic prejudices. The contradictory trends in this sprawling country cannot be captured by crude stereotypes or rigid transition paradigms. Russia, like many other states, is stuck somewhere between a predominantly authoritarian and predominantly democratic order. It can be moving in two directions at once in different spheres, creating a hodge-podge of trends that is difficult to understand, much less model. Thus, Moscow's economic strategy involves greater openness to Western investment and deeper integration into the global economy, but the government's prosecution of critics and scientists for selling classified documents has discouraged open discussion and contacts with foreign colleagues. Russia has adopted a new legal code with many amendments modeled on practices in the United States and Western Europe, yet Putin's vision of a "dictatorship of law" simultaneously entails moving away from Western conceptions of liberty and justice. Important electoral reforms have been implemented, but political parties have been stagnating or losing adherents. Russian judges have gained greater independence, but that independence has not dramatically improved the criminal justice system.[51] Not only have Putin's federal reforms re-centralized power in Moscow, they are also forcing the regions to rescind many of their undemocratic laws.[52] Given such complicated and surprising developments, Western analysts must consciously refrain from extrapolating disappointment over negative trends in one area onto the Russian government or people as a whole.

The pessimists and the optimists share a presumption that Russia's historically determined fate or natural evolutionary endpoint can be seen in advance. The first step in escaping the bipolar swings in American views of Russia is to abandon prophetic pretensions and jettison teleological hubris. Instead of focusing on forecasting the future and constructing (or tinkering with) abstract paradigms, students of post-communist Russia should concentrate on careful empirical study of developments and dynamics in its politics, business, culture, and society. Scholars should spend more time investigating what is really happening and less time judging how the transition measures up according to some predetermined finish line.

While Russophobic essentialists write as if cultural prerequisites were the key, if not sole, determinant for the development of democracy and markets, transitologists tend to eschew culture as an explanatory factor. Both are wrong. Cultural values are one of several important elements facilitating or obstructing democratic and market development. Contrary to the assumptions of Russophobes in the West and Slavophile nationalists in Russia, cultures are not monolithic. They are malleable under the influence of external forces, especially in the era of globalization. This does not mean that Americans can easily complete the cultural transformation and democratization of Russia by launching cold war–style propaganda programs to exploit the presumed gap between the supposedly pro-American Russian people and the obdurate Russian government. It does mean that Western (especially American) culture has strongly affected post-Soviet Russia, though often not in the ways or to the extent Westerners might wish.

Although propaganda campaigns based on an adversarial relationship to the Russian government are unlikely to be very successful (and may actually backfire), there are many ways that Westerners might exert a modest positive influence on Russia's development. This is not the place for a full set of proposals, but a few examples of practical initiatives can be mentioned. While being humbly cognizant of financial misconduct in Western businesses and governments, Western advisers (as Larry Diamond has suggested) can encourage and support the establishment and strengthening of corruption watchdog bodies in Russia, such as an Independent Counter-Corruption Commission and the Audit Chamber.[53] Western non-governmental organizations can promote the establishment of human rights

ombudsmen in each of Russia's regions (at present they are set up in perhaps one-third of the regions) and the expansion of their powers so that they can more effectively investigate complaints regarding violations of press freedom and national minority rights.

Finally, the United States and American corporations can expand their cooperation in the development of energy resources and economic infrastructure in Siberia and the Far East, eventually including a trans-Bering rail tunnel for passenger and oil transport. This would simultaneously boost Russia's economic growth, earn the revenue its government needs for projects such as the modernization of schools and hospitals, and reduce Western dependence on energy resources from Arab and Muslim states.[54] To reinforce this strategy, Russia can be brought into the International Energy Association, and the IEA can be reformed to function as a counter to the OPEC cartel, as Ira Strauss has proposed.[55]

These prescriptions do not presume that Russia is already an ally because of Putin's demonstrated support for the United States in the war against Islamic terrorists. They do suggest some ways to assist the evolution of Russia's domestic institutions and to facilitate a closer international partnership. They should be complemented by other measures, such as gradually deepening Russia's relationship with NATO and its integration into the World Trade Organization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Community, and the Group of Eight (the Group of Seven since Russia's inclusion) to take advantage of the new opening for Russian-Western relations. Russian involvement in these international institutions will ease changes in its political culture, economy, and strategic thinking that will in turn alleviate Western fears and undermine Western stereotypes. Thus, a more stable basis for a Russian-American partnership can be established.

Notes

1. See, for example, James Billington, *Russia Transformed—Breakthrough to Hope: Moscow, August 1991* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
2. For an insightful critique of transitology's democratic teleology, see Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (winter 2002): 3–21.
3. M. Steven Fish, *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 3. For Fish's critique of transitology, see idem, "Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and Russia," *Slavic Review* 58, no. 4 (winter 1999): 798.
4. The *apparat* comprises the bureaucratic institutions and personnel of the Communist Party, as opposed to state institutions. Its personnel were known as *apparatchiki.*
5. On the relatively small proportion of the population that participated in the urban resistance, see, for example, Victoria Bonnell, Ann Cooper, and Gregory Freidin, eds., *Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 13–14, 19.
6. The "power ministries" include the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB.
7. The *nomenklatura* were the elite members of the Communist Party, individuals who received privileges and promotions based on their rank.
8. See Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985–2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2002). For an illustration of the younger elites' approach to a revolution from above, see Egor Gaidar, *Dni porazhenii i pobed* (Days of Defeat and Victory) (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996).
9. On the politics of this grand compromise, see Gordon M. Hahn, "Opposition Politics in Russia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 2 (1994): 305–35.
10. On the privatization scams, see Chrystia Freeland, *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism* (New York: Crown, 2000) and Janine Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–1998* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
11. See Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above*, chaps. 10 and 11.
12. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave of Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
13. Leon Aron, *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
14. See Freeland, *Sale of the Century;* Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia* (New York: Harcourt, 2000).
15. Anders Åslund, *Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Soviet Bloc* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Martin Malia, *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999). On the imperative of modernization, see Jerry Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).
16. See *Novoe Osvoenie Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka* (Reclaiming Siberia and the Far East) (Moscow: Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike, 2002).
17. Soveta Voennoi i oboronnoi politike, *Rossiskaia vneshniaia politika perede vyzovami XXI veka* (Russian Foreign Policy Challenges for the 21st Century), esp. chap. 1, "Mir Vokrug Rossii" (The World Around Russia) (www.svop.tu/yuka/832.shtml); Aleksandr Dugin, *Osovy geopolitiki* (The Fundamentals of Geopolitics) (Moscow, 1997); A. S. Panarin, *History's Revenge* (Revansh istorii) (Moscow: Logos, 1998).
18. Bruce Clark, *An Empire's New Clothes: The End of Russia's Liberal Dream* (London: Vintage, 1995), esp. pp. 1, 93–94; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), esp. pp. 29, 142; Matthew Brzezinski, *Ca-*

sino Moscow: A Tale of Greed and Adventure on Capitalism's Wild 'est Frontier (New York: Free Press, 2001), esp. pp. 311, 258, 186. Matthew is a nephew of former U.S. national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

19. See, for example, Freeland, *Sale of the Century*, pp. 8, 22, 171. Ironically, the 1998 devaluation of the ruble that led many to give up on the dream of Russian capitalism actually helped to pave the way for a return to economic growth by the end of the century.
20. See Richard Pipes, "Russia's Past, Russia's Future," *Commentary* 101, no. 6 (June 1996): 30–38, esp. p. 32; Jonathan Steele, *Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and the Mirage of Democracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Clark, *Empire's New Clothes*.
21. Astrid S. Tuminez, "Russian Nationalism and the National Interest in Russian Foreign Policy," in *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, ed. Celeste A. Wallander (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 53.
22. Gordon M. Hahn, "Russia's Polarized Political Spectrum," *Problems of Post-Communism* 43, no. 3 (May/June 1996): 19.
23. Alessandra Stanley, "A Man Who Rode a Tank Became the Man on Horseback," *New York Times* (January 2, 2000): A3; see also Alison Smale, "Russia's Leaders Are Different. It's the People Who Are the Same," *New York Times* (January 6, 2002): A5.
24. See Nicolai Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); V. V. Leontovich, *Istoriia Liberalizma v Rossii, 1762–1914* (A History of Liberalism in Russia, 1762–1914) (Moscow: Russkii Put, 1995).
25. For George F. Kennan's similar critique of Custine, see David S. Foglesong, "Roots of 'Liberation': American Images of the Future of Russia During the Early Cold War, 1948–1953," *International History Review* 21, no. 1 (March 1999): 63.
26. Ellen Carnaghan, "Thinking About Democracy: Interviews with Russian Citizens," *Slavic Review* 60, no. 2 (summer 2001): 336–67.
27. Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, "Are Russians Undemocratic?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russian and Eurasian Program: Russian Domestic Politics Project, Working Paper No. 20, June 2001.
28. See the summary of the results of surveys conducted by the Russian Institute for Comprehensive Social Research, the Russian Independent Institute for Social and National problems, and Germany's Ebert Foundation, in Mikhail Gorshkov, Natalia Tikhonova, and Vladimir Petukhov, "Tak dal'she zhit' mozhno" (To Live This Way Anymore Is Impossible) *Obschaia gazeta*, no. 10 (March 7, 2002).
29. Gordon M. Hahn, "Growing Middle Class Reinforces Civil Society," *Russia Journal* 5, no. 5. (April 26–May 2, 2002): 10.
30. *New York Times* (June 29, 2002).
31. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "A Great Step Backward," *U.S. News & World Report* (October 9, 2000); Stephen Blank and Theodore Karasik, "'Reforms' That Hark Back to Stalinist Times," *Los Angeles Times* (July 20, 2000).
32. William Safire, "Reading Putin's Mind," *New York Times* (July 23, 2001): A27 and (December 10, 2001): A29.
33. Their refusal was a consequence of the tripartite regime split noted earlier. On the KGB's behavior during the coup, see, for example, Bonnell, Cooper, and Freidin, *Russia at the Barricades*, pp. 18–19; Hahn, *Russia's Revolution from Above*, pp. 429–31.
34. Natalia Govorkian, Natalia Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, *Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym* (In the First Person: Conversations with Vladimir Putin) (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), p. 61.
35. Iu. S. Bortsov, *Vladimir Putin* (Rostov: Feniks, 2001), p. 83.
36. Govorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, *Ot pervogo litsa*, pp. 128–29.
37. Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 1, 18, 38, 43.
38. Ibid., pp. 145–47.
39. *Vremia MN* (October 26, 2001). See the VTsIOM survey showing an ambivalent attitude toward the United States in *Izvestiia* (September 28, 2001).
40. A survey conducted in May 2002 by the ROMIR agency found that 29 percent of Russians considered the United States "friendly," 28 percent thought it was "neutral," and 40 percent characterized it as "hostile." *San Jose Mercury News* (May 24, 2002): 10.
41. Govorkian, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, *Ot pervogo litsa*, pp. 156, 160.
42. For a classic reflection of this dynamic among Russia's Eurasianists, see Panarin, *History's Revenge*.
43. S. Frederick Starr, "Russia's Ominous Afghan Gambit," *Wall Street Journal* (December 11, 2001): 8; Glen Howard, "Moscow's Bid for Influence in Afghanistan: The Kiss of Death of a Broad-Based Government," *Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst* (November 21, 2001) (www.cacianalyst.org).
44. George Friedman, "The Geopolitical Price of War," (October 2, 2001) (www.Stratfor.com).
45. William E. Odom, "Realism About Russia," *National Interest*, no. 65 (fall 2001): 56–67.
46. Quoted in Michael Wines, "In Czar Peter's Capital, Putin Is Not a Great," *New York Times* (May 20, 2002): A7.
47. Jeffrey Tayler, "Russia Is Finished," *Atlantic Monthly* 287, no. 5 (May 2001): 35–52.
48. *New York Times* (December 16, 2001): A4.
49. At the end of the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo, Russian troops rushed to occupy the Pristina airport ahead of NATO forces, briefly triggering an international incident.
50. See, for example, Tayler, "Russia Is Finished."
51. See Todd Foglesong, "Lost in Translation: The Lessons of Russian Judicial Reform," (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace January 12, 2002); Peter H. Solomon and Todd S. Foglesong, *Courts and Transition in Russia: The Challenge of Judicial Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000).

52. See Gordon M. Hahn, "Putin's Federal Reforms and Democratization in the Regions," *Russia Journal* 5, no. 22 (June 14–20, 2002); idem, "The Past, Present, and Future of Russia's Federal State," *Demokratizatsiya* (fall 2002): forthcoming.
53. Larry Diamond, "Winning the New Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Governance Imperative," Institute for Global Democracy, Policy Paper No. 1 (March 2002), p. 11.
54. For some specifics, see Gordon M. Hahn, "Russia's Far East and U.S. National Security," *Russia Journal* 5, no. 24 (June 29–July 4, 2002): 11; Ronald R. Kotas, "The Linking of Two Great Continents By Rail Connections under the Bering Straits," *New Electric Railway Journal*, Free Congress Foundation Online (www.trolleycar.org/observations/kotas010905.htm).
55. Ira Strauss, "How to Secure Russia's Place as an Oil Ally," *Russia Journal* 4, no. 47 (November 30–December 6, 2001): 12.

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